



When what we do is met with resentment, we are indirectly paid 
something of a compliment.1
—Herbert Morris
INTRODUCTION2
For many of the past fifty years, discussion of P. F. Strawson’s argument for 
the indispensability of the reactive attitudes has tended to frame the alterna-
tive in terms of their universal rejection; that is, in terms of the universal 
adoption of what Strawson calls the objective attitude.3 This focus on the 
universal adoption of the objective attitude as an alternative to current prac-
tice is to be expected in the context of the debate between compatibilists 
and incompatibilists, where what is at issue is whether or not necessary con-
ditions for the justification of the entire framework of reactive attitudes—
that is, necessary conditions for “real moral responsibility”—are universally 
1 Morris 1968: 487.
2 I thank my students for discussion and probing questions about Strawson’s seminal 
article. For discussion of Strawson’s account of the objective attitude as refuge, I am par-
ticularly grateful to Abigail Ault. For comments on previous versions of this essay, I thank 
the participants in the joint Carleton/Saint Olaf philosophy departments colloquium, 
the University of Minnesota workshop in Moral, Political, Legal, and Social Philosophy 
(especially commentator Zachary Hoskins), and two anonymous reviewers for Oxford 
University Press.
3 This is true both of those who agree with Strawson and those who oppose him. For 
the former see, e.g., Wolf 1981: esp. 390–1. For the latter, see more recently Sommers 
2007. Some opponents identify the alternative in terms of universal adoption of a frame-
work of nonreactive attitudes (see, e.g., Pereboom 2001). As I note later, Strawson allows 
that the objective attitude can be “emotionally toned”; the nonreactive sadness and dis-
appointment that such opponents would substitute for reactive attitudes such as resent-
ment are, I suggest, just such emotionally toned species of the objective attitude.
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lacking. In this all-or-nothing framing of the debate, opposing sides direct 
themselves to arguing that the universal adoption of the objective attitude 
(perhaps per impossible) would be either a loss of significant magnitude 
or no lamentable loss at all. Everyone recognizes, of course, that Strawson 
himself takes the objective attitude to be fitting in a limited range of cases 
(namely, those that satisfy certain excusing or exempting conditions—the 
truth of determinism notably absent among them). The question is taken to 
be one of whether we can universally adopt the objective attitude without 
lamentable loss in cases where it is, on Strawson’s view, unfitting.
In addressing this question, commentators at best note in passing one par-
ticular type of unfitting employment of the objective attitude that Strawson 
himself acknowledges to be an option for us.4 I refer to what Strawson calls 
a “curious” addition to his main discussion of the objective attitude: his 
acknowledgement that we may strategically employ the objective attitude 
in cases where it is not fitting—such as, in response to mature, competent 
adults with whom we stand in direct interpersonal relationships but with 
respect to whom the “strains of involvement” prove too difficult to bear 
(Strawson 1982: 67). The relative neglect of Strawson’s curious addition (as 
I shall call it) is unfortunate because its examination promises insight into 
what Strawson took to be the costs of a moral psychological scheme devoid 
of the reactive attitudes for creatures like us.
To be sure, the objective attitude in its strategic employment provides 
those who adopt it with a refuge from the strains of interpersonal involve-
ment. As such, it has a prudential payoff. Nonetheless, if Strawson is correct, 
that payoff is short-lived. It is so, in his view, because the strategic employ-
ment of the objective attitude in a relationship forebodes the relationship’s 
demise. Why should that be? My aim in what follows is to submit Strawson’s 
curious addition to greater scrutiny in taking up this question. If the stra-
tegic employment of the objective attitude in interpersonal relationships is 
an option for us—one, moreover, with a prudential payoff—why suppose 
that it forebodes an intimate relationship’s demise? Why can’t we maintain 
an intimate relationship while employing the objective attitude in this way?
To anticipate, Strawson is in my view correct (and characteristically 
perceptive) concerning the costs of prolonged strategic employment of 
the objective attitude for a relationship. In pursuing his suggestion, my 
main aim is to contribute to recent attempts to articulate just what is lost 
when competent adults forgo the participant, reactive attitudes that typi-
cally shape our intimate relationships in favor of adopting the objective 
4 One notable exception to this neglect is to be found in Downie 1966. Sommers 
notes Strawson’s recognition of the strategic employment of the objective attitude, but 
proceeds to ignore it (Sommers 2007: 323).
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attitude—and to do so in a way that attempts to explain why that loss is 
lamentable even after we note that the alternative renders the parties suscep-
tible to both strain and forms of reproach.5 On the account I shall defend, 
what one forfeits in adopting the objective attitude is relating to another’s 
will as having what I call authorial power, a power to infuse his or her behav-
ior with a significant range of meaning. My suggestion, in short, is that 
intimate relationships between competent adults—such as romantic love 
between spouses—cannot be maintained when the refusal of this power 
deprives parties to the relationship the relevant range of meaning.
As I make clear, refusing another this power is compatible both with 
granting his or her will weight and with affording him or her a distinct 
status. If this is right, then to adopt the objective attitude toward a person 
is not to relate to him or her as if to a thing. Although falling within the 
purview of the objective attitude does not thereby reduce one to the status 
of a mere thing, however, the weight and status one retains in the eyes of 
one’s intimates does not suffice for the maintenance of intimate relation-
ships whose normative ideal legitimately aspires to more robust forms of 
engagement.
Although interesting in its own right, I take the answer to my guiding 
question—Why can’t we maintain an intimate relationship while strategi-
cally adopting the objective attitude in a prolonged employment?—to have 
broader significance. Only once we appreciate what is lost when adopting 
the objective attitude locally—that is, in the context of a direct, interper-
sonal relationship—can we presume to make claims about the consequences 
of adopting the objective attitude globally, or universally. By too quickly 
setting our sights on the objective attitude’s universal employment, in short, 
we risk neglecting “what it is actually like to be involved in ordinary inter-
personal relationships” (Strawson 1982: 64). Remedying that neglect, we 
are in a stronger position to resist those who urge enthusiasm about univer-
sal adoption of the objective attitude.
My pursuit of an answer to my question takes the following course. In 
Section 1, I offer a basic characterization of the objective attitude and set out 
the conditions under which adopting it toward a person is fitting. Section 2 
5 Recently, Seth Shabo has focused attention on the implications of adopting the 
objective attitude in the context of intimate relationships. Shabo’s defense of the indis-
pensability of the reactive attitudes, however, does not attend to the strategic deployment 
of the objective attitude in such relationships (see Shabo 2012a). Instead, Shabo focuses 
on the intrapersonal consequences of adopting the objective attitude (whatever one’s 
reasons for doing so) in such relationships (see Shabo 2012b). Thus, although we share 
the conclusion that one cannot maintain intimate relationships with those with respect 
to whom one adopts the objective attitude, Shabo and I arrive at that conclusion by dif-
ferent routes.
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examines an example in which one party to a relationship adopts the objec-
tive attitude as a refuge from the strains of involvement in the relationship. 
After examining the reasons a person might have for this strategic employ-
ment of the objective attitude, I consider in Section 3 its significance for the 
parties to the relationship. In this way, I highlight both the costs of main-
taining the participant reactive attitudes and the costs of their forfeiture in 
a particular case. In concluding, I bring my account of these latter costs to 
bear on the prospects for universal adoption of the objective attitude.
1. THE OBJECTIVE ATTITUDE AND ITS FITTING 
EMPLOYMENT
On Strawson’s view, our natural propensity to the reactive attitudes—atti-
tudes such as resentment, indignation, gratitude, love, and moral praise and 
blame—is responsive to considerations that warrant their modification or 
withdrawal. Among the considerations Strawson highlights are, in one cat-
egory, those that alter our view of the relevant behavior of an agent (e.g., 
behavior resulting in some injury or benefit to us) without thereby altering 
our view of the agent. In his example of someone who steps on your hand 
accidentally, the person has caused you an injury. But where the circum-
stances of the injury are such that the person’s behavior manifests no disre-
gard of expectations, demands, and rights the regulation in accordance with 
which is necessary for aspiring to moral community with us, the circum-
stances enjoin us to view the injury as an inappropriate basis for resentment. 
Perhaps, for example, the person did not notice the position of your hand 
(and couldn’t reasonably have been expected to notice). The person properly 
remains within the scope of the reactive attitudes but this particular injury 
does not signal the kind of disregard necessary for resentment to be fitting in 
the circumstances.6 As Strawson puts it, such circumstances do not “invite us 
to view the agent as other than a fully responsible agent. They invite us to see 
the injury as one for which he was not fully, or at all, responsible” (Strawson 
1982: 72). In addition to (nonculpable) ignorance, Strawson includes in this 
first class of excusing conditions force, among others.
A second class of conditions alters our view not of the behavior but of 
the agent—either temporarily or indefinitely so. In the class of cases involv-
ing temporary suspension of the reactive attitudes, Strawson includes 
cases where a person has acted out of character or under great stress. Such 
6 The sense of fittingness at issue is that which corresponds to evidential propriety. 
See, on this point, D’Arms and Jacobson 2000.
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circumstances appropriately prompt a temporary suspension of the reactive 
attitudes, during which we appropriately view the agent as incapacitated 
in a way that breaks the typical link between her behavior and the quality 
of will she expresses thereby. In the class of cases involving indefinite sus-
pension of the reactive attitudes, Strawson includes cases of psychological 
compulsion and pathology; that is, cases where the typical link between the 
person’s behavior and the quality of will she expresses thereby is severed for 
as long as the compulsory or pathological condition persists. Finally, the 
status of being a child provides an interesting intermediary case, with chil-
dren warranting varying degrees of suspension of our typical expectations 
or demands for goodwill.
Although Strawson’s taxonomy risks appearing ad hoc, the cases have this 
in common: circumstances external or internal to the agent either block 
the inference from the agent’s behavior to underlying judgments, commit-
ments, or attitudes associated with goodwill, ill will, or indifference to the 
legitimate expectations, claims, or demands that properly shape our moral 
relations or inhibit or eliminate the grounds that render the expectations and 
demands legitimate in the first place.7 In such circumstances, the exempting 
conditions warrant us in modifying our reactive attitudes or withdrawing 
them in favor of what Strawson calls the objective attitude toward the per-
son—either temporarily or indefinitely. I take myself to follow Strawson in 
understanding the wholly objective attitude, at its most basic, simply to be a 
stance of no longer regarding its target as properly subject to the normative 
expectations that determine necessary fittingness conditions of the reactive 
attitudes. The wholly objective attitude is fitting just in case a person is inca-
pable of responding to the expectations, claims, or demands that properly 
shape our moral relations. Lacking this capacity, a person ceases to be—as 
we might put the general point—reactive attitude-worthy. More specifi-
cally, her behavior ceases to resentment-worthy, gratitude-worthy, and so 
on for each of the reactive attitudes. In its most basic characterization, then, 
the objective attitude is defined negatively: the objective attitude toward a 
person is an attitude from the perspective of which another is not subject to 
the normative expectations and demands that typically shape our relation-
ships with our fellows—expectations and demands whose flouting would 
otherwise render negative reactive attitudes, such as resentment, legitimate 
responses toward the other’s ill will.8
7 For elaboration of the nature of these expectations and demands, see Wallace 1994 
and 2007, as well as Darwall 2006.
8 Stephen Darwall understands the normative expectations at issue in terms of com-
pliance with what he calls “second-personal” reasons. These are reasons whose recog-
nition each practically competent person has standing to demand of other practically 
Michelle Mason148
This initial gloss risks equating the objective attitude to an affectless 
stance toward another, a form of emotional indifference such as that we 
might take toward things of no concern to us. This would be a mistake. For 
one, in cases where the objective attitude is thus fitting, its targets are prop-
erly exempt not only from the reactive attitudes but from certain other ways 
of relating to them; the change in attitude is not exhausted by changes in 
affect. As Strawson describes the situation: “If your attitude towards some-
one is wholly objective, then though you may fight him, you cannot quarrel 
with him, and though you may talk to him, even negotiate with him, you 
cannot reason with him. You can at most pretend to quarrel or to reason 
with him” (Strawson 1982: 66).
Second, those toward whom the objective attitude is a fitting response 
do not thereby become improper objects of emotional engagement. 
Strawson allows that the objective attitude can itself be “emotionally 
toned” and, moreover, that it can be so in some positive ways—includ-
ing emotionally toned by certain kinds of love. Yet, and this is the point 
I wish to emphasize: In adopting the objective attitude (however fitting) 
toward another, one thereby forfeits a broad nexus of relations to its tar-
get, a nexus of relations necessary to certain other forms of engagement, 
among them forms of engagement constitutive of a significant type of 
love. In what follows, I shall refer to these as various ways of relating to 
the person’s will. In adopting the objective attitude toward another, in 
sum, we forfeit particular ways of relating to the will of the other. How so? 
Clearly, a Strawsonian cannot answer that we thereby relate to the other’s 
will as lacking contra-causal freedom. What power of the will, then, do we 
deny—if only implicitly—when adopting the objective attitude toward 
another?
For a start, consider Strawson’s contrasts between quarreling versus fight-
ing with a person and between reasoning versus talking or negotiating with 
a person. Some commentators object that Strawson offers no argument that 
we cannot quarrel or reason with those toward whom we direct the objec-
tive attitude.9 In response, I suggest we understand Strawson as maintain-
ing that quarreling with someone, in the sense he intends, involves more 
competent persons (e.g., a reason for you not to gratuitously step on my foot); the reac-
tive attitudes (perhaps implicitly) address these demands to their targets, on Darwall’s 
view (2006). Although Darwall has relatively little to say about the objective attitude, 
as I note later, the corresponding view would have its adoption involve refraining from 
addressing second-personal demands. I find this to be too sophisticated an account to 
serve as a basic characterization of the objective attitude. My analysis of the objective 
attitude nonetheless owes an obvious debt to Darwall’s account of the reactive attitudes 
as reactions to others’ responses to second-personal reasons.
9 E.g., Sommers 2007: 324.
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than simply expressing our anger toward a person (and, perhaps, attempt-
ing to provoke the other’s anger), as we might do in fighting him or her. 
Quarreling likewise differs from merely attempting to draw another’s atten-
tion to a particular fact, as we might do in talking to him or her. Finally, 
quarreling involves something distinct from providing the other with incen-
tives to behave as we like, as we might do in negotiating with him or her. 
Instead, in quarreling with another we press upon the other claims or enti-
tlements of ours that we thereby demand the other recognize merely in 
virtue of a status that guarantees us the authority to make them—demands 
to which they may respond either by complying or by attempting to refute 
them in the course of a mutual exchange of reasons.10 Quarreling is, if you 
like, reasoning in a contentious mode. Why suppose that we cannot quarrel 
with fitting objects of the objective attitude?
In being a fitting target of the objective attitude, our would-be 
co-quarreler has already revealed herself to be incapable of governing 
herself in light of the expectations, demands, and/or claims whose rec-
ognition is necessary for moral community with us. Strawson appears 
to assume that the incapacity ramifies beyond other-regarding considera-
tions. He suggests, that is, that attempting to quarrel with such a person 
is futile because she is incapable of acknowledging the imperative force of 
claims or entitlements tout court. Unable to rely on the supposed impera-
tive force of whatever claims we might otherwise make in quarreling with 
her (including, e.g., claims we press on her own behalf ), we condescend 
to her.11 If need be, we instead resort to offering incentives directed at 
influencing her behavior or, at worst, to employing the causal force of our 
brute might.
Strawson’s contrast here is related to the distinction that Stephen Darwall 
has articulated in terms of what he dubs “second-personal” versus non 
second-personal reasons (Darwall 2006). On Darwall’s account, it appears, 
adopting the objective attitude toward a person would amount to respond-
ing to his or her will in a way that refrains from addressing second-personal 
reasons to him or her. As Darwall explains, “Claiming or demanding is not 
just calling some claim or demand to someone’s attention. It is addressing a 
distinctively second-personal kind of reason to another person that aims to 
direct his will, but in a way that recognizes his authority and independent 
10 As Darwall notes, Strawson seems to rely here on the juridical roots of the term 
“quarrel”, which derives from the French quereler and emphasizes a claim to property or 
something else to which one is recognized to have a right (2013: 11). Quarreling with 
another is one way of addressing a reason to another literally (i.e., not metaphorically, as 
I take to be Darwall’s sense in which the reactive attitudes address demands).
11 That is, we literally “come down” from, or cease to press, claims and rights. See here 
the Oxford English Dictionary.
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practical reasoning” (Darwall 2006: 76 (my emphasis)).12 Second-personal 
reasons are distinctive in that, among other things, another’s accepting them 
presupposes your authority to issue the relevant claims or demands and to 
hold the other accountable for compliance (Darwall 2006: 8).
In contrast, consider a case where I appeal to either some incentive or 
to sympathy in order to get you to remove your foot from my hand.13 If, 
instead of demanding that you take your foot off my hand, I offer to pay 
you to do so, I thereby provide you with a reason to remove your foot that 
has nothing at all to do with any authoritative demand, claim, or right that 
I have that you do so. Likewise, if I appeal to your sympathy by way of a 
vivid account of the pain you are causing, thereby causing you pain, I’ve 
now provided you with a reason to ameliorate a situation that pains us both 
(namely, that it will make you feel better); however, I do not thereby suc-
ceed in getting you to recognize a legitimate demand, claim, or right I have 
that you lift your foot. Finally, upset at my lack of success in directing you 
to direct your foot elsewhere, I may bypass your agency altogether and sim-
ply remove your foot by my own brute force.
In the first two cases, although I succeed in providing you with a reason 
to act, that reason is completely divorced from any considerations concern-
ing my authority or status. (In the third case I bypass your will altogether.) 
Second-personal reasons, in contrast, presuppose that I have the authority 
to issue such demands and that you have a competence that makes possible 
their uptake as normative reasons for you to govern yourself in certain ways 
in response.
In short, Strawson’s contrast between quarreling and fighting (and 
Darwall’s distinction between addressing second-personal versus addressing 
non second-personal reasons) throws into relief distinct modes of relating 
to another being, among them distinctly personal modes of relating that 
arguably are forfeited with adoption of the objective attitude.
Now, before turning to the significance of forfeiting these ways of relat-
ing to another in the case of competent adults, I want to note two things in 
order to avoid confusion.
First, taking the objective attitude toward another is consistent with relat-
ing to his or her will in a way that affords it a certain weight in our delibera-
tions concerning how to respond to him or her. We are not, then, reduced to 
relating to those with respect to whom we adopt the objective attitude as if 
relating to a thing or force of nature. After all, a person who is incompetent 
12 Cf. Gary Watson’s discussion of the connection between the reactive attitudes and 
moral address (Watson 1993).
13 On the appeal to sympathy and how it fails to engage another second-personally, 
see Darwall 2006: 5–7.
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with respect to second-personal reasons may nonetheless have preferences 
about the treatment that she and others receive. In taking the objective atti-
tude toward a person, we in no way commit ourselves to ignoring this fact. 
Thus, the fact that a fitting target of the objective attitude opposes or desires 
a certain mode of treatment should continue to weigh with us in determin-
ing how to behave toward him or her. Indeed, taking the objective attitude 
toward a person is consistent with affording his or her will decisive weight in 
certain matters (e.g., in matters concerning his or her welfare).14
Second, adopting the objective attitude toward another is consistent 
with affording the other one kind of authority or status. Now, Darwall 
takes mutual authority and accountability relations to be among the nor-
mative felicity conditions for second-personal reasons. In addressing a 
second-personal reason to another, on his view, you presuppose both your 
own authority to issue claims and demands and the same authority of your 
addressee. Likewise, in holding another accountable to you for compliance 
with the demand, you must presuppose the addressee’s competence to gov-
ern her- or himself by holding her- or himself accountable for compliance, 
as well as your own such competence (Darwall 2006).
It may thus appear that, on Darwall’s view, fitting targets of the objective 
attitude—insofar as they are second-personally incompetent—stand out-
side the circle of second-personal concepts altogether. To be sure, in the 
case where a person is incompetent with respect to second-personal reasons 
(because incapable of recognizing claims or demands addressed to them), it 
would be surprising to find them knowingly addressing to another a demand 
or claim as a demand or claim. It does not follow, however, that such a per-
son therefore lacks a status sufficient for generating demands on us. A com-
petent person might do wrong, after all, to someone who is mentally ill 
(where doing wrong is something other than merely injuring or harming 
the person). In doing wrong with respect to a mentally ill person, moreover, 
I thereby render myself a fitting target of the accountability-seeking indig-
nation and guilt that mark the fact that I have violated a second-personal 
reason to act otherwise. This is so even if the mentally ill person is herself 
incompetent with respect to second-personal reasons (and, hence, not her-
self a fitting object of my resentment when she does things that would war-
rant resenting a competent adult) and her moral psychological repertoire 
lacks resentment. As I see it, nothing vitiates the rights of such a person, 
even if the demands associated with those rights can in fact be pressed only 
by some delegate and their flouting registered only by some third person’s 
indignation.
14 For a distinction between affording another’s will decisive weight (i.e., treating it as 
“substantially decisive”) and treating it as “structurally decisive”, see Daniel Groll 2012.
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If this is correct, then the fact that one is a fitting target of the objective 
attitude because one lacks the competence to respond to second-personal 
reasons does not entail that one lacks an authority or status that gener-
ates second-personal reasons for others. If we grant that second-personal 
competence is not necessary for this status, then what one forfeits when 
one is the fitting target of the objective attitude (namely, being related to 
as one who has second-personal competence) is less extensive than were we 
to view targets of the objective attitude as altogether outside the circle of 
second-personal concepts and, thus, their status as insufficient to generate 
second-personal reasons for others.
2. A STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE 
OBJECTIVE ATTITUDE AS REFUGE: BEING 
REGARDED AS “BENEATH CONTEMPT”
In taking up the objective attitude toward a person, we thereby forfeit what 
I suggested are distinctively personal ways of relating to him or her. In the 
cases where the objective attitude is fitting, we do so perforce. Although 
something is forfeited in these cases, one has no attractive alternative. What 
possibly could be gained by attempting to foster and maintain reactive atti-
tudes toward such persons? Given the nature of their presumed incom-
petence, the difference could hardly matter to them. Likewise, given the 
absence of justification, the alternative would appear at best a pointless and 
at worst a delusional fiction to us.
Strawson’s curious addition, in contrast, presents the objective attitude in 
a very different, strategic employment.15 He writes:
The objective attitude is not only something we naturally tend to fall into in 
cases like these, where participant attitudes are partially or wholly inhibited 
by abnormalities or by immaturity. It is also something which is available as 
15 To be clear, although talk of a strategic employment of an attitude makes it sound 
as if the attitude must be voluntarily adopted, on my view it need not be. In the standard 
cases, Strawson suggests that we may adopt or naturally fall into the objective attitude; 
so, too, we may adopt or naturally fall into the objective attitude as refuge. For the latter 
case, we can imagine someone whose intimate relationship causes him great psychic pain 
but who cannot bring himself to voluntarily sever the relationship. He begins spending 
longer hours at the office, devoting weekends to hunting with the guys, and letting his 
personal appearance slip. Such behavior fits the profile of the unconsciously emotionally 
unavailable; in the case I imagine, this is not a pathological response to childhood abuse 
but an unconscious defense mechanism against a perceived current threat. In what fol-
lows, I leave such cases aside to focus on the attempt to voluntarily adopt the objective 
attitude as a strategy for avoiding such threats.
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a resource in other cases too. We look with an objective eye on the compul-
sive behaviour of the neurotic or the tiresome behaviour of a very young child, 
thinking in terms of treatment or training. But we can sometimes look with 
something like the same eye on the behaviour of the normal and the mature. 
We have this resource and can sometimes use it; as a refuge, say, from the strains 
of involvement; or as an aid to policy; or simply out of intellectual curiosity. 
Being human, we cannot, in the normal case, do this for long, or altogether. 
If the strains of involvement, say, continue to be too great, then we have to do 
something else—like severing a relationship. But what is above all interesting 
is the tension there is, in us, between the participant attitude and the objective 
attitude (Strawson 1982: 80).16
In order to illuminate this tension, and so bring to the fore what is lost by 
the prolonged strategic employment of the objective attitude, I want to 
return to an example I’ve discussed elsewhere, this time with a shift in focus 
(Mason 2003).17
Camille has come to regard her husband, Paul, with contempt upon 
coming to believe that he has tried to barter her sexual favors for his pro-
fessional advancement. Camille’s contempt manifests itself in her shun-
ning Paul’s advances and refusing to explain herself in response to his 
initial queries about her behavior. Indeed, it is important to Camille that 
any recognition of his failing come about through Paul’s own apprecia-
tion of his opportunistic exploitation of her. If, alternatively, he reveals 
himself blind to his failing, this too is something she appears eager to 
know, presumably because her judgment of him will subsequently be cor-
respondingly worse.
In my previous defense of Camille’s contempt, I suggest that hers is an 
accountability-seeking response directed at Paul in virtue of his violation 
of her legitimate expectation of his goodwill. This response, I argued, earns 
a place in the Strawsonian pantheon of participant reactive attitudes (see 
Mason 2003: 245). I now want to suggest that this response is an especially 
apt one to investigate in this context precisely because of the way in which 
one kind of contempt—that which I shall call reactive contempt—can give 
rise to a different kind of contempt—that which I shall call nonreactive 
contempt. Moreover, I now want to suggest, we can understand nonreactive 
contempt to be but one “emotionally toned” species of objective attitude, 
16 Compare: “For reasons of policy or self-protection we may have occasion, perhaps 
temporary, to adopt a fundamentally similar attitude to a ‘normal’ human being; to con-
centrate, that is, on understanding ‘how he works’, with a view to determining our policy 
accordingly or to finding in that very understanding a relief from the strains of involve-
ment” (Strawson 1982: 69).
17 The example derives from Moravia 1954. The novel is the source for Jean-Luc 
Godard’s 1963 Le Mépris.
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in this case exhibited in its strategic employment as refuge.18 More specifi-
cally, we can understand Camille’s nonreactive contempt to be a form of 
strategically employed objective attitude emotionally toned by aversion and 
recoil.19
Some philosophers seem inclined from the start to understand contempt 
as such to be incompatible with holding another accountable. Thomas Hill, 
for example, describes a “cold, silent contempt” that “is a deep dismissal, a 
denial of the prospect of reconciliation, a signal that conversation is over” 
(Hill 2000: 60). Contrasting a “furious argument and accusation” that 
leaves room for the possible resumption of communication to this cold, 
silent contempt, Hill maintains that the former demands to be heard, while 
the latter “walks away in disgust” (2000: 60). Disgust, notably, is a non-
reactive response to a person consistent with the objective attitude. I am 
happy, however, to concede Hill’s talk of contempt here: Hill is speaking of 
nonreactive contempt.
Nonetheless, if what I have previously argued is correct, a certain form of 
contempt does demand to be heard. Regarding another with contempt need 
not exempt the other from a demand, or legitimate expectation, of goodwill; 
on the contrary, certain forms of contempt are a properly focused response 
to the violation of such demands and expectations. On my account, it is 
only against the background context of such legitimate demands and expec-
tations that reactive contempt qualifies as properly focused on its target. 
The point is one that Strawson himself takes to hold for all the so-called 
negative of the reactive attitudes:
Indignation, disapprobation, like resentment, tend to inhibit or at least to limit our 
goodwill towards the object of these attitudes, tend to promote an at least partial and 
18 Nonreactive contempt is not always an attitude that is strategically employed as a 
means of avoiding emotional strain. For one, nonreactive contempt might be an attitude 
cultivated with other ends in view (hence, the nonreactive contempt of a misogynist or 
racist, which functions to dehumanize its target, not to emotionally protect the con-
temnor). Second, nonreactive contempt may, as in the case of the reactive attitudes, be 
something we naturally fall into given certain facilitating (or debilitating) conditions; 
again, racism is an apt example.
19 To my knowledge, commentators on Strawson’s essay have failed to consider 
that the term “objective attitude” is properly understood to refer to a class of different 
type attitudes, just as “reactive attitude” is thus properly understood. If this is correct, 
among the interesting questions raised is: What are the positive emotionally toned types 
of objective attitude? One candidate, it seems to me, is nonreactive—because uncon-
ditional—love. Although it is compatible with the view I defend here that universal 
adoption of the objective attitude as emotionally toned by unconditional love would be 
preferable to universal adoption of it as emotionally toned by aversion and recoil, being 
the recipient of unconditional love is no less a denial of authorial power than that which 
I discuss here—both for the same reasons and (although I cannot argue this here) with 
the same undesirable consequences.
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temporary withdrawal of goodwill; they do so in proportion as they are strong; and 
their strength is in general proportioned to what is felt to be the magnitude of the 
injury and to the degree to which the agent’s will is identified with, or indifferent to, 
it. (These, of course, are not contingent connections.) But these attitudes of disap-
probation and indignation are precisely the correlates of the moral demand in the case 
where the demand is felt to be disregarded. The making of the demand is the proneness 
to such attitudes. The holding of them does not, as the holding of objective attitudes 
does, involve as a part of itself viewing their object other than as a member of the 
moral community. The partial withdrawal of goodwill which these attitudes entail, the 
modification they entail of the general demand that another should, if possible, be 
spared suffering, is, rather, the consequence of continuing to view him as a member 
of the moral community; only as one who has offended against its demands (Strawson 
1982: 77).20
I see no reason to suppose that the demands in question need be addressed, in 
any other than a metaphorical sense, to the violator.
Now, of course those exempted from the relevant demands or expectations 
are outside reactive contempt’s purview. But there is another way one might 
find oneself outside the scope of another’s reactive contempt. There are per-
sons who, despite their competence, are so corrupt and with regard to whom 
continued reactive engagement is so fraught that we naturally describe them 
as being “beneath contempt”. To say that someone is beneath contempt often 
just is to say that one can no longer be bothered to reactively engage with him 
or her—the costs are too high and the benefits too few to continue to invest 
one’s dwindling energy in maintaining such engagement. Such circumstances 
are ripe for strategic deployment of the objective attitude.
How, then, might Camille’s contempt change from one of reactive 
contempt to the kind of nonreactive contempt consistent with a strategic 
employment of the objective attitude toward Paul? To aid in imagination, 
suppose that rather than responding to Camille’s contempt with attempts 
to understand it, Paul is in fact much more knowingly callous than Moravia 
portrays him. Let’s also imagine him being defensive and inclined to lash 
out with petty cruelties whenever others question his motives. In such 
circumstances, it might quickly become unbearable for Camille to main-
tain the kind of affective sensitivity and vulnerability that typically char-
acterize healthy relationships between intimates.21 Unable or unwilling to 
20 Although I cannot argue this here, I believe it is a mistake to understand the 
so-called negative reactive attitudes to be retributive in any pejorative sense.
21 Note that the circumstances in which it becomes unbearable to maintain the kind 
of affective sensitivity and vulnerability that typically characterize healthy relationships 
between intimates need not be those in which the unbearable person acts malevolently. 
One can be prompted to avoid strains of involvement in response to behavior that would 
otherwise warrant so-called positive reactive attitudes (e.g., gratitude) no less than the 
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immediately sever the relationship, she attempts for prudential reasons to 
forgo her reactive contempt in favor of strategic employment of the objec-
tive attitude toward Paul. Her reason for adopting the objective attitude, 
that is, has nothing to do with considerations that speak to its fittingness (as 
described in Section 1); we are not supposing that Camille has come to view 
Paul as exempt because incompetent with respect to the demands of good-
will that one spouse legitimately expects of another. Rather, Camille can no 
longer withstand the strains of continued reactive engagement with Paul. 
What would the telling marks of this particular strategic employment of the 
objective attitude be? And what would being the target of Camille’s strategic 
employment of this particular type of objective attitude—as opposed to the 
target of her reactive contempt—amount to for Paul?
3. CONSEQUENCES OF THE OBJECTIVE 
ATTITUDE AS REFUGE
Let us consider, first, Camille’s perspective. As I understand the scenario, 
what she is resolving to do in the face of Paul’s cruelty is, simply, to cease to 
care in a particular way about his violations of her legitimate expectation for 
better treatment. What marks the difference between her reactive contempt 
and the nonreactive contempt that results if her strategy is successful? From 
Camille’s perspective, the distinguishing marks are just those that I sug-
gested characterize the objective attitude in its fitting instances.
First, we will find her detached from any emotional involvement predi-
cated on compliance with or violation of second-personal reasons. Indeed, 
we will find her denying that Paul can wrong her any longer, since his 
behavior can no longer have the requisite meaning from the perspective of 
Camille’s objective stance. At best (or worst?) Paul’s behavior can disappoint 
her or make her sad.
Second, Camille forgoes not only certain emotional but also other forms 
of rational engagement that likewise implicate second-personal reasons. She 
cannot quarrel with him from the position of someone with authority to 
address second-personal reasons to act in certain ways and avoid others; she 
negative. Imagine, e.g., the case of a friend who is an overly enthusiastic do-gooder. Here, 
feelings of gratitude may legitimately shade over into feelings of indebtedness and—
eventually—motivate a similar search for refuge. Lacking a good example for such a 
case, I invite the reader to imagine an alternate course for another failing marriage: that 
of Nick Hornby’s protagonist Katie Carr and her loathsome-turned-sanctimonious hus-
band, David (Hornby 2001).
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can at best hope to appeal to external incentives that might influence his 
behavior.
Finally, although in adopting the objective stance Camille does not 
thereby take herself to be licensed to treat Paul however she pleases (it is 
still incumbent upon her to afford his will weight and himself a status or 
authority sufficient to distinguish her morally impermissible from per-
missible treatment of him), she has ceased to relate to Paul in a way that 
acknowledges a distinct power of will: that of conferring personally directed 
meaning on his attitudes and behavior. Call this power the will’s authorial 
power. The meaning of a judgment-sensitive attitude or action is the signifi-
cance that a person has reason to assign the attitude or action in light of 
the reasons for which its author adopted or performed it (see here Scanlon 
2008). Of course, Camille does have reason to assign Paul’s behavior the 
significance of having wronged her. These are, moreover, reasons of the 
right kind to warrant her resentment or (reactive) contempt.22 In adopting 
the objective attitude as refuge, however, Camille signals her unilateral exit 
from a mutual accountability relation with Paul. Her participant status in 
such a relation is one she is willing to forgo because she finds the strains of 
retaining that participant status too great. Subsequently, on my view, Paul 
can no longer wrong Camille.
To be clear, because Paul is in fact capable of responding to the normative 
expectations and demands that shape interpersonal relations between inti-
mates, he is in fact capable of doing wrong or wronging others. Moreover, 
absent some excuse, he is blameworthy for so doing. However, I regard the 
fact that Paul does things to Camille that it is wrong to do to her as insuf-
ficient for wronging her. A necessary condition for wronging her is standing 
in the mutual accountability relation from which Camille has made her 
exit.23
Now, there is a sense in which Paul in fact retains authorial power despite 
Camille’s refusing him such power. Obviously, he can wrong others with 
respect to whom he stands in mutual accountability relations. However, the 
sense in which any of us has authorial power with respect to a particular 
person is akin to the sense in which we have a power to convince that per-
son. Authorial power is a capacity I understand on analogy with capacities 
associated with so-called success verbs; that is, verbs that describe actions 
that require a particular outcome in order to be completed (e.g., “con-
vince”). Exercises of authorial power, like exercises in convincing another, 
22 That she has reasons of the right kind to react with contempt is a more controversial 
claim than that she has reasons of the right kind to respond with resentment. For defense 
of the latter claim, see Mason 2003.
23 I thank an anonymous reader for urging me to clarify this point.
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require uptake by the relevant others in order to succeed in achieving what 
they attempt. In refusing to interpret Paul’s actions as expressions of will, 
Camille refuses that uptake. This is the sense in which Camille’s adoption of 
the objective attitude constitutes a refusal of authorial power to Paul.
Consider this refusal next from Paul’s perspective. If the consequence 
of being in this way the target of Camille’s objective attitude is that Paul 
thereby escapes her reactive contempt, why suppose he is any worse off for 
the loss?
Recall that Paul is, however malevolent, nonetheless second-personally 
competent. He understands that Camille has the authority to legitimately 
expect, indeed demand, better of him. He also recognizes that intimates 
are prone to certain attitudinal responses in holding them to account for 
the violation of such demands. And yet, in adopting the objective stance, 
Camille has immured herself from this particular range of attitudes. Because 
these attitudes are precisely those that otherwise respond to the significance 
of an intimate’s attitudes and behavior for her personally, their eschewal 
necessarily exerts a distancing effect on him. It does so relative to the vulner-
ability characteristic of lovers within the scope of each other’s reactive atti-
tudes. Were it not for such a distancing effect, the strategy of adopting the 
objective attitude couldn’t serve as a refuge of any sort. Additionally, in cases 
such as this, where we imagine Camille thereby treats Paul differently from 
other intimates, we can understand the relevant notion of distance relative 
to her other relationships, as well. The intimates Camille holds closest, the 
ones about whom she cares the most, presumably are those toward whom 
she continues to regard it as worth her while to reactively respond. She has 
excluded Paul from this circle of intimates.
The significance of Paul’s behavior, moreover, is one that we cannot ade-
quately register by nonreactive analogues such as sadness or regret.24 Allow 
me to illustrate why by appeal to a different example.25 Rejecting an account 
of blame on which it necessarily involves feelings of resentment or other 
negative moral emotions, T. M. Scanlon reports that in judging his friend 
to be blameworthy for telling cruel jokes about him, he “might just feel sad” 
(Scanlon 2008: 136).26 Note, however, that whereas resentment reproaches 
Joe as a violator of Tim’s legitimate relationship-grounded demands, sad-
ness focuses on an undesirable outcome Joe produces (as would regret and 
state-focused disappointment). Supposing that sadness is the right kind 
24 Cf. here Pereboom 2001: ch. 7.
25 I discuss the example in Mason 2011.
26 Here Scanlon appears sympathetic to certain concerns that motivate Pereboom’s 
rejection of the reactive attitudes, among them a concern that they harbor retributive 
impulses.
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of feeling to be warranted by evidence of a person’s wronging you ignores 
the way in which wronging constitutes a violation of relational, essentially 
person-focused, demands.27 It is just this possibility of person-to-person 
engagement (among other things) that Paul forfeits in becoming the target 
of Camille’s objective stance. This is so whether her strategic employment of 
the objective attitude is emotionally toned by nonreactive contempt (and, 
so, aversion and recoil) or simply sadness (with its attendant inaction or 
withdrawal).28 In either case, the distancing that results is, in short, in ten-
sion with the intimacy required to sustain romantic love.29
Second, Paul is barred from a certain mode of reasoning with Camille. 
Paul will no longer find himself a recipient of Camille’s trust that he is 
someone legitimately expected to respect her authority to provide him 
direct and conclusive normative reasons to act in certain ways versus others. 
At best, he will be offered incentives strategically designed to influence his 
behavior, appeals to the pain he might sympathetically share in injuring her, 
or the pleasure he might sympathetically take in benefitting her. Although, 
if effective, these modes of interacting suffice to place Camille in a spe-
cific causal connection to Paul’s will, we rightfully take these modes to be 
27 The proponent of nonreactive analogues for the reactive attitudes might at this 
point appeal to a form of disappointment that is not state-directed: disappointment in 
a person. Consider, however, that it suffices for such warranted disappointment that the 
other has frustrated some desire of yours that he or she is in a position to satisfy—there 
need not be any connection between that desire and what the other is morally obligated 
to do (and so with desires whose frustration would count as wronging you). This alone 
marks an important contrast between such disappointment and resentment.
For further discussion of the relational feature of the demands implicit in reactive 
attitudes such as resentment, see Wallace 2007: 303.
28 On withdrawal as a typical action tendency of sadness, see Nichols 2007: esp. 420.
29 What if, however, a couple correctly decides that continued vulnerability to the 
reactive attitudes is detrimental to their relationship because, say, the resulting strains 
are too great? They vow to replace resentment with sadness or disappointment. (Again, 
I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing the example.) The first thing to note is that 
the primary detriment to this relationship, it seems to me, results from their so wronging 
each other that the negative reactive attitudes pose a psychic burden. That said, the sug-
gestion is that substituting sadness and disappointment for the reactive attitudes would 
benefit the relationship without any significant loss. As I previously noted, if the parties 
to this relationship thereby treat each other differently from their other intimates, then 
we can understand the “distancing” I claim is involved relative to the kind of emotional 
engagement they reserve for those others.
Waiving that point, there is the additional consideration, again previously noted, that 
neither sadness nor disappointment have a necessary conceptual connection with wrong-
ing—and so this couple thus ceases to afford any special significance to those normative 
expectations whose violation marks moral injury in particular. That one would cease 
to thus distinguish such injuries from other kinds in the case of our beloved, I suggest, 
marks a failure to care sufficiently about the normative expectations whose violation we 
have most reason to protest.
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appropriate, if at all, to children and the incapacitated. Taken up toward the 
competent, in contrast, they take on a perniciously patronizing cast. Such 
a stance, again, is in tension with the reciprocity essential to the normative 
ideal of mature romantic love.
Finally, although in adopting the objective stance Camille does not 
thereby take herself to be licensed to treat Paul however she pleases (it is 
still incumbent upon her to afford his will weight and himself a status suf-
ficient to distinguish morally permissible treatment from that allowed only 
toward a mere thing), she has ceased to relate to Paul in a way that affords 
his will a distinct power: what I have called the authorial power of confer-
ring personally addressed meaning on his attitudes and behavior. Such 
authorial power is necessary if one’s behavior is to count as expressive in 
ways that we must take to matter—not only because, as Strawson writes, 
“it matters to us, whether the actions of other people—and particularly 
of some other people—reflect attitudes towards us of goodwill, affection, 
or esteem on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence on 
the other” (Strawson 1982: 76). It matters to us whether others take our 
actions to reflect such qualities. In assigning to Paul’s attitudes and actions 
only those meanings that her objective stance can countenance, Camille 
deprives Paul of a power for which he has reason to demand recognition 
(however ill a use to which it has previously been put).
Consider here, again, another example. Consider the case of an adult 
daughter whose wrongdoing is, to her mind, much too quickly forgiven by 
a parent. Whereas the benevolent parent is motivated to do so by a concern 
for her child’s happiness, the result is that the daughter is in fact angered. 
Why? Why is that an intelligible response? My suggestion is that the daugh-
ter regards it to be important—and important to her relationship with her 
parent—that her attitudes and actions be recognized as having the meaning 
she takes the fact of her violation to give them. The too-quick forgiveness 
resembles adoption of the objective stance in suggesting that the parent 
doesn’t appreciate their meaning or simply doesn’t care sufficiently about 
it in the context of the relationship to mount a protest.30 In a similar vein, 
30 Thus, a forgiveness that avoids objectivity of attitude cannot deny the meaning of 
the forgiven behavior.
A perhaps more poignant example of the loss I articulate is found in Rufus Johnson, a 
character in Flannery O’Connor’s “The Lame Shall Enter First” (O’Connor 1971: 445–
82). An unrepentant juvenile delinquent, Johnson has little patience with his would-be 
benefactor Sheppard’s efforts at explaining and excusing Johnson’s deviousness by appeal 
to his disadvantaged upbringing and deformed foot. Sheppard interprets Johnson’s 
actions as attempts to somehow compensate for the sense of weakness that his disfigure-
ment provokes. Johnson will have none of this. I take Johnson’s impatience to register 
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in taking up the objective stance, one usurps a meaning-giving, authorial 
power for which the competent correctly demand recognition and whose 
exercise they have reason to value.
CONCLUSION
Those who oppose Strawson in order to counsel universal adoption of the 
objective attitude—such as the self-described objective attitude enthusi-
asts31—focus our attention on the consequences of a person’s adoption 
of the objective attitude toward all. They justify such indiscriminate, or 
universal, application by appeal to facts that, correspondingly, apply uni-
versally: for example, the purported fact that we generally lack the precon-
ditions for “real moral responsibility”, or that consequentialist calculations 
or theological doctrine speak overwhelmingly in the objective attitude’s 
favor. Such a focus on the “big picture” encourages one to overlook impor-
tant aspects of how adoption of the objective attitude would play out in 
specific intimate relationships. In that context, far from being an impos-
sibility for us, Strawson recognized the employment of the objective stance 
as a resource. Why then balk at the universal adoption of an admitted 
resource?
I hope to have gone some way toward explaining, where Strawson 
did not, why that resource is one we must ultimately find wanting. In 
immuring one to certain kinds of emotional engagement and rational 
relations with another—and deafening one to the meaning one has rea-
son to assign another’s behavior—the objective attitude erodes forms 
of regard necessary for sustaining intimate relationships among crea-
tures like us. If the objective attitude enthusiasts were correct, universal 
employment of the objective attitude would usher in a reign of univer-
sal refuge characterized by relationships without strain. If what I have 
argued here is correct, in contrast, far from enabling us to take refuge in 
relationships, the objective attitude employed as refuge signals that we 
are, instead, on our way out.
his frustrated demand for a form of recognition that Sheppard refuses him, the recogni-
tion that he is capable of evil. On a less Manichean view, Johnson’s is a demand for the 
recognition that he is capable of wronging others. “I lie and steal because I’m good at 
it” he insists. “My foot don’t have a thing to do with it!” The novel ends with Johnson 
having enticed Sheppard’s only child to commit suicide. Thanks to Anthony Rudd for 
recommending O’Connor’s story.
31 Sommers embraces the term (2007: 325).
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